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A PORTRAIT OF THE ARTIST'S ESTATE
AS A COPYRIGHT PROBLEM
Rebecca F. Ganz*
I. INTRODUCTION
On May 30, 2007, a federal judge in the Northern District of
California awarded Carol Loeb Shloss, a professor of English at
Stanford University, attorney's fees in a recently settled lawsuit
against the estate of author James Joyce.1 Shloss had no choice but
to sue the Joyce estate in order to gain rights to some of the late
author's published works and family letters for her own scholarship.2
The settlement agreement enabled Shloss to cite the materials in
question for publication in the United States, without threat of
litigation by the Joyce estate By awarding Shloss attorney's fees,
the court indicated that she was the "prevailing party" in the
settlement agreement because she achieved a material alteration of
the legal relationship of the parties.4 Although this seems like a
minor victory in the scheme of everyday litigation, to James Joyce
scholars and defenders of fair use of copyrighted works, this decision
is an important step in protecting the creative freedom embodied in
the fair use doctrinei
* J.D. Candidate, May 2009, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles; B.A., Magna cum Laude
in Visual & Environmental Studies, Mar. 2002, Harvard College. I thank Professor John
Tehranian for his guidance and my family for supporting me in all things legal and creative.
1. See Shloss v. Sweeney, 515 F. Supp. 2d 1083, 1086 (N.D. Cal. 2007).
2. Tim Cavanaugh, Portrait of the Old Man as a Copyright Miser, L.A. TIMES, June 5,
2007, http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/la-oew-cavanaugh5jun05,0,2402066.story?coll=la-
promo-opinion.
3. Firstamendmentcenter.com, Scholar, James Joyce Estate Settle Copyright Dispute,
http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/news.aspx?id=18335 (last visited Feb. 23, 2008).
4. See Shloss, 515 F. Supp. 2d at 1086.
5. Press Release, Stanford Law School, Stanford Scholar Wins Right to Publish Joyce
Material in Copyright Suit Led by Stanford Law School's Fair Use Project (Mar. 22, 2007),
http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/system/files/Shloss+Press+Release.pdf.
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The aggressive defense of intellectual property by famous
estates is not uncommon because of the amount of money and the
types of personalities involved. Estates of dead authors, actors,
artists, and musicians can earn several million dollars every year in
royalties.6  Although children or grandchildren of the deceased
typically control the creative interests of the estate,7 an estate's
interests can also pass to a beneficiary who bears little or no relation
to the deceased.8
In fact, these estates have been granted increasing power in
recent years. In October 2007, in response to ongoing litigation
regarding right of publicity and the Marilyn Monroe estate,9
California Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger signed into law a bill
that would effectively devise a post-mortem right of publicity to the
estates of personalities who died prior to 1985.10 Heirs of celebrities
who were already deceased when the original law went into effect in
1985 argued that their rights should be retroactive and successfully
lobbied the California legislature to revise the statute accordingly."
In conjunction with the recent extension of copyrights terms, 12 this
type of legislation indicates increasing value in the intellectual
6. See Lea Goldman & David M. Ewalt, Top-Earning Dead Celebrities, FORBES, Oct. 29,
2007, http://www.forbes.com/business/2007/10/29/dead-celebrity-eaming-biz-media-deadcelebs
07_czjlg_1029celebland.html (determining that the best-paid celebrities from October 2006 to
October 2007 were Elvis Presley, $49 million; John Lennon, $44 million; Charles M. Schulz, $35
million; George Harrison, $22 million; Albert Einstein, $18 million; Andy Warhol, $15 million;
Dr. Seuss (Theodor Geisel), $13 million; Tupac Shakur, $9 million; Marilyn Monroe, $7 million;
Steve McQueen, $6 million; James Brown, $5 million; Bob Marley, $4 million; and James Dean,
$3.5 million).
7. See, e.g., Arthur Lubow, Arbus Reconsidered, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Sept. 14, 2003, at 30
("Doon Arbus was 26 when [photographer] Diane [Arbus] died. As the older daughter of a
divorced mother, she took on the responsibility of managing the estate. Her response to the
critics was to clamp the spigot shut.").
8. Matthew Belloni, Monroe, Money Fueling Right of Publicity Battle, HOLLYWOOD REP.,
Sept. 14, 2007 at 90 ("Last year, [Marilyn] Monroe's right of publicity reportedly earned more
than $8 million for Anna Strasberg, the widow of acting coach Lee Strasberg, whom Monroe
asked in her will to dispose of the leftovers (or 'residuary' estate) she didn't give to anyone
else.").
9. See, e.g., Shaw Family Archives Ltd. v. CMG Worldwide, Inc., 486 F. Supp. 2d 309
(S.D.N.Y. 2007).
10. 2007 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 439 (West) (S.B. 771) (to amend CAL. CIv. CODE § 3344.1
(2000)); see also Jordana Lewis, Long-Dead Celebrities Can Now Breathe Easier, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 24, 2007, at E4.
11. See Lewis, supra note 10.
12. See, e.g., Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (upholding the statutory extension of
copyright terms to seventy years after the death of the creator).
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property rights of estates. Essentially, the legislative and judicial
branches of the government are empowering estates to keep creative
work out of the public domain.
In this climate, litigious estates have increasing control over
access to post-mortem intellectual property rights at an increasing
cost to the public.13 Now that copyrights last for seven decades after
the death of the creator, 4 it is the opinion of this author that estates
often have too much control over the use of the creator's work.
Estates generally have the money to litigate just to protect the image
of the deceased and the privacy of the family. 5 On the other hand,
scholars and artists rely on the text or the creative work in question
just to continue their work, and the cost of litigation is generally
prohibitive. "
James Joyce scholar and intellectual property attorney Robert
Spoo eloquently describes the protracted monopolies of estates:
They allow a mere right-holder to become a privileged and
arbitrary custodian of culture. And all of this would be
exactly as it should be were these monopolies confined to
one generation or two. But to see this capricious veto
power being exercised at a period so startlingly remote
from the cultural and historical origins of the work in
question is dispiriting. The phrase "the dead hand" comes
irresistibly to mind, except that it is a living hand that is
permitted to reach out to control the spontaneous choices of
the public domain. 7
Notwithstanding the expanded duration of copyright, our legal
system has failed to ensure adequate protection for creative works
under the fair use doctrine. 8 Many common usages fall under this
statute, which is supposed to promote creativity in society by
allowing a member of the public to use the copyrighted work for
13. See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig, The Creative Commons, 55 FLA. L. REV. 763, 764 (2003).
14. 17 U.S.C. § 302 (2000); see also Eldred, 537 U.S. at 186.
15. See, e.g., D.T. Max, The Injustice Collector, NEW YORKER, June 19, 2006, at 34, 36.
16. See, e.g., Negativiand, Changing Copyright, http://www.negativland.com/changing_
copyright.html (last visited Oct. 25, 2007).
17. Robert Spoo, Three Myths for Aging Copyrights: Tithonus, Dorian Gray, Ulysses, in
NATIONAL LIBRARY OF IRELAND, JOYCE STUDIES 2004, No. 6, at 24 (2004).
18. See, e.g., LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: How BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY
AND THE LAW TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY 99 (2004).
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criticism, scholarship or research.' 9 However, estates often engage in
copyright misuse by threatening legal action to prevent what might
actually be a fair use of the materials in question." Because of their
powerful position, estates can also claim to own copyrights that are
already in the public domain2 or owned by others; or worse yet,
estates may abuse their power by even trying to prevent access to
materials in libraries or other public places.22
Because many of these cases settle without litigation,23 further
litigation is needed on this matter to set precedent for future
generations. The fair use statute should also be revised to be more
helpful to the potential copyright user. Specifically, we need a
clearer definition and application of fair use that will enable artists
and scholars to be certain that their own work complies with the legal
requirements. This would then level the playing field between
copyright holders and copyright users, particularly when estates
threaten legal action. Moreover, our judicial system must make it
clear to estates with copyright interests that there will be
repercussions if they abuse their power and engage in copyright
misuse. Additionally, as artists and estates become more protective
of their copyright interests, there is an overwhelming need for public
awareness about the fair use rights guaranteed by statutory law.
Part II of this Note discusses the Shloss case and how it is
illustrative of the current problems with copyright misuse by estates.
Part III summarizes the existing structure of copyright law and how
it pertains to estates in particular. Part IV illuminates problems with
existing copyright law and how it functions to enable estates to abuse
their power. Parts V and VI propose options for remedying these
abuses and explain why they are justified. Part VII concludes that
the current copyright regime must change in order for artists and
19. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000) ("Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 and 106A, the
fair use of a copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction in copies.., for purposes such
as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use),
scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright.").
20. See, e.g., Max, supra note 15, at 38.
21. See, e.g., Rob Faulkner, Author Wins Peter Pan Rights Fight, THE HAMILTON
SPECTATOR (Ontario, Can.), Mar. 24, 2005, at A05.
22. Max, supra note 15, at 41; see also Timothy Hill, Entropy and Atrophy: The Still
Unclear Status of the Fair Use of Unpublished Works and the Implications for Scholarly
Criticism, 51 J. COPYRIGHT Soc'y U.S.A. 79, 97-98 (2003).
23. See, e.g., Faulkner supra note 21.
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scholars to continue their own creative work without the constant
threat of litigation.
II. STEPHEN JOYCE'S VENDETTA
Stephen Joyce's aggressive copyright defense is legendary.24 As
James Joyce's grandson and sole living heir, he feels that his primary
purpose is to quell any scholarship that he finds distasteful or an
invasion of his family's privacy.25 He has a history of harassing
authors and artists until they buckle under the strain of trying to
obtain legal rights to quote from the late author's writings.26 In fact,
Stephen Joyce is proud of his record in defeating the publication of
scholarly and creative work.27
In the beginning, Carol Loeb Shloss's situation was no different
from the countless other artists and scholars who wanted to quote
from James Joyce.28 Shloss's scholarship focused on the life of
Lucia Joyce, James Joyce's mentally ill daughter and the supposed
muse behind his novel Finnegan's Wake. 9  Shloss relied on
numerous sources for her research, including Lucia's memoirs,
medical records, and materials in the Irish National Library.3"
Knowing that Shloss was planning to publish a book on this
sensitive subject, Stephen Joyce fired off numerous threatening
letters to Shloss and her publisher, Farrar, Strauss and Giroux.3
Prior to publication, the publisher's attorney wrote Stephen Joyce to
inform him that Shloss's work would be protected by the fair use
doctrine, and Stephen Joyce retorted that the claim "sounds like a
bad joke or wishful thinking."32 Fearing a lawsuit, Farrar, Strauss
and Giroux released a heavily edited version of the biography in
24. Cavanaugh, supra note 2.
25. This tends to include most academic works. See Max, supra note 15, at 36 ("[Stephen
Joyce] did not see what the two hundred and sixty-one works of criticism in the catalogue of the
Library of Congress, say, could add to [James Joyce's] legacy. Academics, he said at one point,
are 'people who want to brand this great work with their mark. I don't accept that."').
26. Id. at 37.
27. Id. at 35, 41.
28. Id. at 34-35.
29. Firstamendmentcenter.com, supra note 3; Dinitia Smith, A Portrait of the Artist's
Troubled Daughter, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 2003, at B9.
30. Many of the sources were outside the Joyce estate's control. See Cavanaugh, supra note
2; Smith, supra note 29.
31. See Max, supra note 15, at 38.
32. Shloss v. Sweeney, 515 F. Supp. 2d 1068, 1073 (N.D. Cal. 2007).
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2003 without the copyrighted materials in question.33 In reviews
appearing in the New York Times, the New Yorker, and the San
Francisco Chronicle, critics noted a lack of documentary support for
Shloss's theories. 4
For most scholars trying to fight the Joyce estate, this would
have been the end of the line.35  However, Shloss met Lawrence
Lessig-an attorney, professor and head of Stanford Law School's
Center for Internet and Society, who offered to take on her case pro
bono.3 6 Lessig suggested that Shloss create a web-based supplement
of the deleted material to aid other scholars.37 Lessig wrote to the
Joyce estate regarding the website, clarifying that this supplement
would also fall under the doctrine of fair use.38 In response, the
estate's attorneys claimed this would be an unwarranted infringement
of copyright and suggested there would be legal consequences. 9
Shloss filed suit in 2006 seeking multiple remedies, including
declaratory judgment that an electronic supplement would be fair use
and not infringe on any of Joyce's copyrights, and declaratory
judgment that the Joyce estate misused its copyrights by threatening
litigation and attempting to deny access to materials that were
outside of its legal control. 4' According to Lessig, this was the first
lawsuit to accuse a literary estate of copyright misuse.'
Unfortunately, the case settled out of court and, as a result,
failed to establish precedent for future cases.42 However, the
settlement in Shloss's favor indicates that the Joyce estate sensed that
it would have lost the battle in the courtroom. This is even more
likely in light of Stephen Joyce's general litigiousness, and
indications that the Joyce estate had the money to fight a protracted
33. Id. ("Ultimately, more than thirty pages were cut from a manuscript of four hundred
pages.").
34. Id.
35. See Max, supra note 15, at 37.
36. Id. at 38.
37. Id. at 42.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Shloss v. Sweeney, 515 F. Supp. 2d 1068, 1074 (N.D. Cal. 2007); Cavanaugh, supra
note 2.
41. Max, supra note 15, at 38.
42. Cavanaugh, supra note 2.
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legal battle.43 Even though this settlement and award of attorney's
fees only directly affected the policies of one estate, it implies that
other estates will need to be a little more careful in defending their
copyrights.
III. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR COPYRIGHT
In order to promote progress in the arts, the Framers of the
United States Constitution granted authors "the exclusive Right" to
their writings "for limited Times."" The Framers envisioned
copyright "to be the engine of free expression" in that it would create
an "economic incentive to create and disseminate ideas."45  The
Framers limited the copyright term to allow the public eventual
access to the fruits of the artist's labors.46
Adopted in 1787, the Copyright Clause was followed by the first
Copyright Act in 1790, which protected books, maps, and charts for
a maximum of two fourteen-year terms: an original term and a
renewal term if the author was still alive.47 If the author failed to
renew the copyright, the work became part of the public domain.48
Once in the public domain, anyone could use the work without
paying a licensing fee to the original copyright holder.49
A. The Rules Have Changed
To account for changed conditions, the 1909 Copyright Act
extended copyright protection to a twenty-eight-year original term
followed by a twenty-eight-year renewal term.5" This scheme lasted
several decades until the 1976 Copyright Act streamlined and
extended the copyright term to the life of the author plus an
43. See Max, supra note 15, at 41, 43 ("[Stephen Joyce] noted [to Shloss in a letter], 'You
should be aware of the fact that over the past decade the James Joyce Estate's "record," in legal
terms, is crystal clear and we have proven on a number of occasions that we are prepared to put
our money where our mouth is,.... A person with knowledge of the Joyce estate's finances said
that it generates three to four hundred thousand dollars annually.").
44. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
45. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enter., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985).
46. Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 228 (1990).
47. MARSHALL LEAFFER, UNDERSTANDING COPYRIGHT LAW 6-7 (3d ed. 1999).
48. LESSIG, supra note 18, at 133.
49. See Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1262 (11th Cir. 2001)
("[Tlhe limitation [on copyright duration] ensures that the works will eventually enter the public
domain, which protects the public's right of access and use."); Lessig, supra note 13, at 764.
50. LEAFFER, supra note 47, at 7-8.
746 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LA WREVIEW [Vol. 41:739
additional fifty years." For corporations, the term was the lesser of
seventy-five years from first publication or one hundred years from
creation. 2 The 1976 Act also eliminated the renewal requirement,
granting all works-regardless of profitability-the maximum term. 3
By the 1990s, copyright protection extended to many types of
creative works, including music, art, film, and architectural works. "
Yet, a number of iconic American works, including Mickey Mouse
and famous songs by George and Ira Gershwin, were scheduled to
enter the public domain around the year 2000."5 Fearful of losing the
value of these creations, copyright owners and their heirs
successfully lobbied Congress in 1998 to have the copyright term
extended by another twenty years under what is commonly known as
the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act ("CTEA").6
Because of this extension, copyright protection now lasts for the life
of the author plus an additional seventy years. 7 Upon the death of
the author, copyrights can pass to the next of kin through a
testamentary document or by intestate succession. 8
Copyright distinguishes between ownership of the actual work
and ownership of the copyright. 9 Although one could theoretically
have rights to a physical painting or manuscript in perpetuity,
ownership of the copyright itself only lasts for a limited amount of
time as designated by Congress.6" For this reason, those who argue
51. Id. at 9.
52. Id. at 9-10.
53. LESSIG, supra note 18, at 135.
54. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2000) ("Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this title, in
original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known or later
developed, from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either
directly or with the aid of a machine or device.").
55. See Dinitia Smith, Immortal Words, Immortal Royalties? Even Mickey Mouse Joins the
Fray, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28, 1998, at B7.
56. Sonny Bono thought copyright protection should last forever. Dennis S. Kaijala, Judicial
Review of Copyright Term Extension Legislation, 36 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 199, 244 n. 160 (2002).
57. 17 U.S.C. § 302.
58. See id. § 201(d)(l).
59. See id. § 202 ("Ownership of a copyright, or of any of the exclusive rights under a
copyright, is distinct from ownership of any material object in which the work is embodied.
Transfer of ownership of any material object, including the copy or phonorecord in which the
work is first fixed, does not of itself convey any rights in the copyrighted work embodied in the
object; nor, in the absence of an agreement, does transfer of ownership of a copyright or of any
exclusive rights under a copyright convey property rights in any material object.").
60. See Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1263 (1 1th Cir. 2001) ("In a
society oriented toward property ownership, it is not surprising to find many that erroneously
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that owning a copyright is the same as owning a house are sadly
mistaken. With only a few exceptions, however, the copyright
owner has the exclusive right to reproduce the work and create
derivative works during this time.6 In most cases, licenses to use the
work in question must be negotiated with the copyright holder.
Without a license, use of the copyrighted work is prohibited unless it
falls under the doctrine of fair use.62
B. Application and Defenses
Copyright law attempts to strike a balance between the exclusive
rights of the copyright holder and the public access necessary to
promote creative exchange.63 For this reason, there are limits on the
exclusive rights of the copyright holder during the copyright term.
Developed in common law and codified in the 1976 Copyright Act,
the fair use doctrine allows for reproductions of copyrighted work
"for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting,
teaching... scholarship, or research."'  In determining whether a
usage constitutes fair use, the court must consider one of the most
important purposes of copyright: the "free flow of ideas-
particularly criticism and commentary. '65 The justification for fair
use is that copyright already gives copyright holders "a powerful
monopoly in their expressive works. It should not.., grant them a
power of indirect censorship."66
There is also a developing affirmative defense of copyright
misuse, which is related to the defense of "unclean hands."
Essentially, courts interpret the defense to apply when "copyright is
equate the work with the copyright in the work .. "). To satisfy the Constitution and maximize
copyright, Jack Valenti proposed that protection last forever minus one day. Karjala, supra note
56, at 244 n.160.
61. 17 U.S.C. § 106.
62. See id. §§ 106-07.
63. See Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE L.J.
283,283-85 (1996).
64. 17 U.S.C. § 107 ("In determining whether the use made of a work in any particular case
is a fair use the factors to be considered shall include- (1) the purpose and character of the use,
including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; (2)
the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in
relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential
market for or value of the copyrighted work.").
65. Suntrust Bank, 268 F.3d at 1268.
66. Id. at 1283.
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being used in a manner violative of the public policy embodied in the
grant of a copyright. 6 7 District courts have found copyright misuse
when the behavior of the copyright holder undermines the
Constitution's goal of promoting creative expression.68 Under these
circumstances, the court will look for a sufficient nexus between the
alleged anti-competitive behavior and the policy of copyright law to
promote creativity.69  In theory, the misuse doctrine prevents
copyright holders from enforcing their copyrights during the period
of misuse.70 Once the misuse ceases, however, copyright holders can
ultimately recover for any acts of infringement that occurred during
the period of misuse.71
Compulsory licensing can be another check on the exclusive
rights of the copyright holder. Normally, licenses are negotiated
with the copyright holder, but in a few instances, the Copyright Act
supersedes the market mechanism, and Congress sets licensing fees.72
In these cases, the prospective user can pay established royalties and
obtain a compulsory license without the copyright owner's
permission.73  Such compulsory or statutory licenses are most
commonly used in allowing musicians to "cover" recordings of
songs by other songwriters at set rates, and for radio and cable
television broadcasts.74 Compulsory licenses are designed to reduce
the transaction costs associated with the private market system.75
Copyright law attempts to balance the exclusive rights of the
copyright holder and the rights of the general public to access the
copyrighted work. Although these concepts make logical sense in
statutory form, they are often difficult to apply and expensive to
litigate. This reality leaves scholars and artists in a difficult position
when they attempt to use a copyrighted work in a form that seems
67. Lasercomb Am., Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970, 978 (4th Cir. 1990).
68. See, e.g., Metro-Goidwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 454 F. Supp. 2d 966,
995 (C.D. Cal. 2006).
69. Id.; see also In re Napster, Inc. Copyright Litig., 191 F. Supp. 2d 1087, 1108 (N.D. Cal.
2002) (cited by MGM Studios, Inc., 454 F. Supp. 2d at 995, for the same point).
70. MGM Studios, Inc., 454 F. Supp. 2d at 994.
71. Id. at994-95.
72. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 111, 114, 115, 118, 119(2000).
73. LEAFFER, supra note 47, at 285.
74. LESSIG, supra note 18, at 55-61.
75. LEAFFER, supra note 47, at 288.
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like fair use.76 Estates with money to litigate, and a misplaced sense
of the role of copyright, further complicate the issue.
IV. CRITIQUE OF EXISTING LAW
Although copyright law has evolved due to changed conditions
and new media, it often fails to protect the utilitarian vision of
progress in the arts. Moreover, the goals of the creative estate often
run counter to the purported goals of copyright, and weaknesses in
the system allow many of these estates to abuse their power.
A. Depleting the Public Domain
A significant problem with the current legal framework for
copyright is that it depletes the public domain by making so many
creative works inaccessible. This limitation will adversely affect
future generations of artists and scholars. Modem-day copyright
holders had the benefit of the public domain in creating their seminal
works. In writing Ulysses, critics argue that James Joyce "borrowed"
from the rich Irish public domain.77  In creating his famous
characters, Walt Disney "borrowed" from the Brothers Grimm
because their works were already in the public domain.78 George
Gershwin "borrowed" from African-American songwriters and
musicians in creating works like "Rhapsody in Blue."79 Although
these artists were clearly talented in their own right, the families have
become household names in part because of access to the public
domain. Instead of realizing the value of maintaining a rich public
domain,8" the heirs of these artists want to prevent others from having
the same opportunities.8'
The broad copyright control sought by estates is generally
motivated by common goals: (1) a desire to maintain the profitability
76. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577 (1994) ("The task is not to
be simplified with bright-line rules, for the [fair use] statute, like the doctrine it recognizes, calls
for case-by-case analysis.").
77. Spoo, supra note 17.
78. Lessig, supra note 13, at 764 ("Under the current practice, no one can do to the Disney
Corporation what Disney did to the Brothers Grimm.").
79. Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, Copyright on Catfish Row: Musical Borrowing, Porgy and
Bess, and Unfair Use, 37 RUTGERS L.J. 277, 303-05, 310 (2006).
80. In fact, one of the three main goals of the Copyright Clause is protection of the public
domain. See Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1262 (11 th Cir. 2001).
81. Karjala, supra note 56, at 235.
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of the estate;82 (2) a desire to maintain the post-mortem integrity of
the author or artist;83 and (3) a desire to maintain the privacy of the
family.84  Although these motivations are legitimate and
understandable from the perspective of the heirs, they have very little
to do with the purported goal of copyright protection: "to stimulate
activity and progress in the arts for the intellectual enrichment of the
public."85
Estates are also concerned with maintaining the integrity of
individual copyrighted works. In petitioning the Supreme Court
regarding the constitutionality of lengthening the copyright term, the
Dr. Seuss estate voiced its fear that access to famous works in the
public domain enables people to "make use of well-known characters
to glorify drugs or to create pornography."86  Although there is a
common fear that new works will debase the original work,87 this
kind of commentary or "transformative use" has long been a vital
part of the doctrine of fair use.88 Parody, for example, "can provide
social benefit, by shedding light on an earlier work, and, in the
process, creating a new one."89  Moreover, there is often no
82. Arewa, supra note 79, at 318 ("As is the case with other business interests, controllers of
copyright artistic legacies actively advance their strategic interests to a great extent by the same
means as businesses do more generally.").
83. See, e.g., Hill, supra note 22, at 96.
84. Max, supra note 15, at 35-36 ("'I am not only protecting and preserving the purity of my
grandfather's work but also what remains of the much abused privacy of the Joyce family."'
(quoting Stephen Joyce)).
85. Pierre N. Leval, Towards a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REv. 1105, 1107 (1990).
86. Brief for Dr. Seuss Enterprises, L.P. et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents,
Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (No. 01-618).
87. Smith, supra note 55, at 59 ("Marc G. Gershwin, a nephew of George and Ira Gershwin
and a co-trustee of the Gershwin Family Trust, said: 'The monetary part is important, but if works
of art are in the public domain, you can take them and do whatever you want with them. For
instance, we've always licensed "Porgy and Bess" for stage performance only with a black cast
and chorus. That could be debased. Or someone could turn "Porgy and Bess" into rap music.'").
88. Leval, supra note 85, at 1111 ("If... the secondary use adds value to the original-if the
quoted matter is used as raw material, transformed in the creation of new information, new
aesthetics, new insights and understandings-this is the very type of activity that the fair use
doctrine intends to protect for the enrichment of society.").
89. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994). But see Rogers v.
Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 310 (2d Cir. 1992) (holding that the copied work was not an object of the
parody, and artist Jeff Koons's parody of modem society was not enough to constitute parody for
the purposes of the fair use doctrine).
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indication that criticism or commentary will necessarily have an
adverse effect on the value or meaning of an original work.9"
There can be another side effect of extreme copyright control, as
exemplified by the Joyce estate. If scholars and artists are afraid to
make fair use of the work of a literary great, this concern can lead to
the gradual erosion of the author's place in the literary canon. James
Joyce once commented about his writing: "I've put in so many
enigmas and puzzles that it will keep the professors busy for
centuries arguing over what I meant, and that's the only way of
insuring one's immortality."'" To a certain degree, new scholarly
and creative work can keep an author in the public dialogue and
preserve her place in literature for future generations. Unfortunately
for Joyce, his estate is using copyright law to stifle the professors
who could ensure his immortality.
B. Divergent Interests
The interests of heirs or legal successors are often not the same
as the interests of the artist. As Professor Justin Hughes notes,
"[d]espite what George Gershwin's heirs may argue, people who
support themselves in the arts choose their projects guided either by
their muse or by likely economic return in the short or medium term
(as in monthly rent and mortgage payments), not on the basis of
likely returns to great-grandchildren."92 In this day and age, once
artists see the increasing value of their creative work and copyrights,
they too want to pass on the fruits of their labors.93 However, even if
an artist comes to see her career as a commercial venture, there is a
difference between the artist who continues to create new work and
the business model of the estate.94
90. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 591 ("But when, on the contrary, the second use is transformative,
market substitution is at least less certain, and market harm may not be so readily inferred."); see
also Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1276 (11 th Cir. 2001) (finding that
Alice Randall's parody "The Wind Done Gone" would not act as a market substitute and
significantly harm "Gone With the Wind").
91. Max, supra note 15, at 37.
92. Justin Hughes, Fair Use Across Time, 50 UCLA L. REv. 775, 794 (2003).
93. Smith, supra note 55, at B9 ("'As a songwriter, I'm about to become a grandmother for
the first time,' said Marilyn Bergman, president of the American Society of Composers, Authors
and Publishers and the co-author of [two songs]. 'Why can't I pass on the fruit of my works to my
grandchild? My songs, like my house and other valuables? This is a property issue,' Ms.
Bergman said.").
94. See Arewa, supra note 79, at 318.
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Without a doubt, estates are perfectly suited to collect copyright
royalties; however, they are generally not as fit to make creative
decisions. As Professor Olufunmilayo Arewa accurately notes,
"[h]eirs and legal successors are in most instances not creative."95
Leaving an heir with the power to control the "creative" output of the
estate for seventy years after the death of the artist runs contrary to
the goal of copyright, which is to promote progress in the arts.
As noted above, the artist's estate has become a "privileged and
arbitrary custodian of culture,"96 generally with no background or
training in the arts. Judge Pierre N. Leval eloquently coined the term
"widow censor" to describe the powerful position given to heirs and
estates in our present system.97 Although these copyright holders
have legitimate concerns in protecting the integrity of the deceased
and the work in question, the Copyright Clause cannot sanction
censorship based on the right-holder's personal taste.
Moreover, for most estates, the lengthening of copyright
duration has very little to do with providing an incentive to create
new works since the creator is already dead.9 Although estates can
argue that they are using new media to create derivative works,99 the
Framers probably did not envision this type of contribution as
progress in the arts. When the estate is run primarily as a family
business, there is little protection for the public domain and the
utilitarian conception of copyright.
C. Misapplication of Fair Use and Misuse
Because the contours of the fair use doctrine are not exactly
clear and must be applied on a case-by-case basis, °0 estates can
95. Id. at 320; see also Alan Riding, Moral Rights or the Outraged Heir: Real-Life Drama at
House of Molidre, N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 2007, at E3 ("[Heirs of creative artists] may have no
artistic talent of their own, but they bask in reflected glory, receive royalties and determine how
works are interpreted or exploited.").
96. Spoo, supra note 17.
97. Leval, supra note 85, at 1118 ("A historian who wishes to quote personal papers of
deceased public figures now must satisfy heirs and executors for [what is now seventy years] after
the subject's death. When writers ask permission, the answer will be, 'Show me what you write.
Then we'll talk about permission.' If the manuscript does not exude pure admiration, permission
will be denied.").
98. Arewa, supra note 79, at 285.
99. Brief for Dr. Seuss Enterprises, L.P. et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents,
supra note 86.
100. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577 (1994).
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manipulate the meaning in their favor as they draft threatening letters
intended to limit potential fair use.1"' Estates generally have the
money to litigate and are not afraid to threaten litigation to put an
end to derivative works they do not appreciate. 10 2  Creators of
derivative works are unsure of their legal footing in part because the
courts have yet to define a bright-line rule for fair use that takes into
account the public policy factors behind copyright protection.0 3 In
the end, uncertainty regarding which works will qualify undermines
the fair use doctrine's purpose of protecting certain derivative
works. 1"4 Instead of fulfilling the utilitarian notion of progress in the
arts, the fair use doctrine as applied tends to consolidate the wealth
of a few lucky creators."5
The aggressive behavior of estates may border on or even
become copyright misuse.0 6 But as with a claim that a particular
usage constitutes fair use, it would require costly litigation for a court
to determine whether the behavior of the copyright holder
undermines copyright's purpose of promoting creative expression.' 7
If an artist or scholar thinks she is engaging in a fair or
transformative use, yet an estate threatens copyright litigation, the
only option is to do what Carol Shloss did: bring a claim of misuse
and ask for a declaratory judgment regarding potential fair use. °8
However, this suit would not have been possible without the pro
bono legal efforts of Lawrence Lessig and Stanford Law School's
Fair Use Project.0 9 Facing this uphill legal battle and the associated
101. See Rebecca Tushnet, Copy This Essay: How Fair Use Doctrine Harms Free Speech and
How Copying Serves It, 114 YALE L.J. 535, 585 (2004) ("Owners often assert that any copying
by anyone, however minimal, requires permission, and many would-be users lack the resources to
challenge these ownership claims.").
102. See, e.g., Max, supra note 15, at 41.
103. See Sarah A. Gessner, Comment, The Wind Done Gone, the Law Done Wrong?: Fair
Use and the First Amendment in Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 35 CoNN. L. REV. 259,
286 (2002).
104. Gideon Parchomovsky & Kevin A. Goldman, Fair Use Harbors, 93 VA. L. R-Ev. 1483,
1485 (2007).
105. See John Tehranian, Et Tu, Fair Use? The Triumph of Natural-Law Copyright, 38 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 465, 466-67 (2005).
106. See, e.g., Max, supra note 15, at 38.
107. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 454 F. Supp. 2d 966, 995 (C.D.
Cal. 2006).
108. See, e.g., Shloss v. Sweeney, 515 F. Supp. 2d 1068, 1074 (N.D. Cal. 2007).
109. See Max, supra note 15, at 38.
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fees, many creatives opt out of making derivative works, which
ultimately results in censorship of ideas and expression." 0
V. PROPOSAL
Because these issues in the copyright system are the result of
many years of statutory and common law, there is no simple solution
to this current predicament. By clarifying the available defenses and
raising public awareness about their existence, however, we can
work towards leveling the playing field between copyright holders
and potential copyright users.
A. Clarifying Fair Use
On its webpage, the U.S. Copyright Office admits that "[t]he
distinction between 'fair use' and infringement may be unclear and
not easily defined. There is no specific number of words, lines, or
notes that may safely be taken without permission."'' . The website
lists some examples of activities that courts have held as fair use;" 2
unfortunately, they are too vague for everyday application. This
section of the website goes on to suggest that the "safest course" of
action is to get permission from the copyright owner and further
suggests that use of copyrighted material should be "avoided" unless
fair use would clearly apply."
3
The ambiguous description and application of fair use in
common law and in statute leads to overdeterrence of potential users
and underuse of copyrighted works."4 The asymmetrical stakes of
the copyright holder and the copyright user often amplify the
problem." 5 Moreover, fair use is an affirmative defense, placing the
110. See, e.g., Dan Brekke, Tangled Up in Seuss, SALON, Apr. 13, 2007, http://
www.salon.com/news/feature/2007/04/13/dylan-seuss/print.html.
11 . U.S. Copyright Office-Fair Use, http://www.copyright.gov /fls/fl102.html (last visited
Feb. 23, 2008).
112. Id. ("[Q]uotation of excerpts in a review or criticism for purposes of illustration or
comment; quotation of short passages in a scholarly or technical work, for illustration or
clarification of the author's observations; use in a parody of some of the content of the work
parodied ..." (emphasis added))
113. Id.
114. Parchomovsky & Goldman, supra note 104, at 1486.
115. William F. Patry & Richard A. Posner, Fair Use and Statutory Reform in the Wake of
Eldred, 92 CAL. L. REv. 1639, 1658 (2004).
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burden of proof at trial on the copyright user.' 6 A clearer fair use
statute would level the playing field between copyright holders and
potential copyright users and could limit the occurrence of misuse.
The question becomes: what type of derivative use definitively
constitutes fair use?
The main problem with fair use is that it is currently applied on
a case-by-case basis.'17 Some scholars suggest that clearly defined
safe harbors would solve the problem by clarifying the law for
potential copyright users."8  Moreover, carefully tailored safe
harbors would provide certainty to potential creators of derivative
works without unduly compromising the rights of copyright
owners." 9 For example, Professor Gideon Parchomovsky and Kevin
Goldman propose that a permissible safe harbor for reproduction of
literary works could be three hundred words or less, and no more
than fifteen percent of the copyrighted work.'2 ° Although this would
eliminate some of the uncertainty in the application of fair use, any
safe harbor still leaves a gray area for usages that exceed the safe
harbor limits.
Another problem is that the current system separates copyright
usage into two distinct spheres-fair use and infringement. 2' Some
scholars propose a third alternative specifically tailored to
transformative or productive uses.'22 Professor John Tehranian
suggests that these expressive forms of copyright use should be
deemed per se non-infringing and should be exempt from statutory or
actual damages.'23 In this model, profits from any commercial
exploitation of the transformative work would be evenly split
116. See, e.g., JuNelle Harris, Beyond Fair Use: Expanding Copyright Misuse to Protect
Digital Free Speech, 13 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 83, 98 (2004).
117. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577 (1994).
118. See, e.g., Parchomovsky & Goldman, supra note 104, at 1488.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 1489.
121. See, e.g., Erin E. Gallagher, Note, On the Fair Use Fence Between Derivative Works and
Allegedly Infringing Creations: A Proposal for a Middle Ground, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 759,
760 (2005) ("Like a fence between the plaintiff's and the defendant's land, the line drawn by fair
use between derivative works and allegedly infringing ones appears to leave courts no choice but
to place the case before them squarely into either the plaintiff's or the defendant's territory.").
122. John Tehranian, Whither Copyright? Transformative Use, Free Speech, and an
Intermediate Liability Proposal, 2005 BYU L. REV. 1201, 1207.
123. Id.
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between the copyright holder and the copyright user.'24 This model
would allow creative copyright users to continue making their work
while still allowing copyright holders to reap the benefits of their
original creations.
Just as the compulsory licensing scheme for cover recordings
provides musicians simplified access to copyrighted songs,'25 this
would allow artists and scholars straightforward access to
copyrighted art or writing. This scheme is constructive because it
bifurcates control and compensation of copyright, leading to more
creative output. For most copyrights, control and compensation are
directly linked, providing the artist's estate with a powerful platform
for abuse and censorship.'26 With this intermediate liability model,
copyright users essentially pay for access to the work in question
without needing permission from the copyright holder. Artists and
scholars attain the rights they need to create their work at a
reasonable price, while estates make money to maintain the business
model. The purposes of the Copyright Act are fulfilled without the
censorship of creative expression.
As estates continue to gain control of intellectual property rights
for increasing durations, the fair use doctrine must operate
effectively to check this power. Fair use was designed to preserve
the free flow of ideas and to prevent censorship of creative works.'27
In order for the fair use doctrine to fulfill its intended purpose, it
must be easy enough to apply without constant litigation. Whether
by statute or judge-made law, authors and artists must have access to
reliable fair use standards so that they can avoid buckling under the
stifling pressure of aggressive copyright holders.
B. Misuse as a Viable Defense
Copyright holders will continue to threaten creators of derivative
works even if the proposed use would fall under the fair use
doctrine.'28 Through its website, Chilling Effects exposes countless
"cease and desist" letters from overly aggressive copyright holders
124. Id.
125. AL KOHN & BOB KOHN, KOHN ON Music LICENSING 693 (3d ed. 2002); see also supra
notes 72-75 and accompanying text.
126. See Tehranian, supra note 122, at 1247.
127. Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1264, 1268 (11 th Cir. 2001).
128. Patry & Posner, supra note 115, at 1654.
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addressed to creators of derivative works. 129  A recent study by the
organization indicates that many of the copyright claims do not even
rest on a solid legal foundation. 3 ° By sending threatening legal
letters, these overly aggressive copyright holders tend to overclaim
their copyrights, causing a chilling effect on creativity. 3'
In these cases, copyright misuse should be a viable defense to
prevent copyright holders "from leveraging their limited monopoly
to allow them to control areas outside the monopoly."'3 2  More
specifically, the misuse doctrine would prevent copyright holders
from enforcing their copyrights while engaging in misuse.'33
Copyright holders should not be able to rely upon the benefits of the
legal system while they are taking unfair advantage of the legal
rights provided by the system. When properly applied, the misuse
doctrine would discourage copyright holders from grossly
exaggerating their rights at the expense of the fair use rights of
creators of derivative works.'
The doctrine of copyright misuse would serve as an additional
check on the extended copyright monopoly of estates. It is one of the
only checks on copyright that arises from the behavior of the
copyright holder, as opposed to the actions of the copyright user.'35
Some scholars see this as a cure to many of copyright's current
problems,'36 while others are more skeptical of its scope.'37 The
major weaknesses of the misuse doctrine are: (1) it is more shield
than sword;'38 and (2) as of now, the common law would still need to
129. Chilling Effects Clearinghouse, http://www.chillingeffects.org (last visited Feb. 23,
2008); see also Victoria Smith Ekstrand, Protecting Public Policy Rationale of Copyright:
Reconsidering Copyright Misuse, 11 COMM. L. & POL'Y 565, 565 (2006).
130. See Ekstrand, supra note 129, at 565-66; Emily Meyers, Art on Ice: The Chilling Effect
of Copyright on Artistic Expression, 30 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 219, 233-34 (2007).
131. Ekstrand, supra note 129, at 566.
132. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1026 (9th Cir. 2001).
133. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 454 F. Supp. 2d 966, 994 (C.D.
Cal. 2006).
134. Patry & Posner, supra note 115, at 1659.
135. Kathryn Judge, Note, Rethinking Copyright Misuse, 57 STAN. L. REV. 901, 915 (2004).
136. Brett Frischmann & Dan Moylan, The Evolving Common Law Doctrine of Copyright
Misuse: A Unified Theory and Its Application to Software, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 865, 872
(2000).
137. See Judge, supra note 135, at 915; Harris, supra note 116, at 117.
138. Ekstrand, supra note 129, at 577; Dennis S. Karala, Copyright Protection of Operating
Software, Copyright Misuse, and Antitrust, 9 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 161, 185 (1999).
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be applied on a case-by-case basis.13 9 Just as the fair use doctrine
was eventually added to the Copyright Act, some scholars have
proposed codification of the misuse doctrine in order to provide more
certainty to the system. 140
Similarly, the Digital Millennium Copyright Act ("DMCA")
includes a provision to combat misrepresentation of copyright in the
online environment.' 4' As with traditional claims of misuse, this
issue is rarely litigated because website creators and popular
websites like YouTube generally comply with takedown demands to
avoid costly litigation.'42  In July 2007, Stephanie Lenz sued
Universal Music for abusing copyright law by forcing YouTube to
remove a home video of her baby dancing to the Prince song "Let's
Go Crazy."' 43  The Electronic Frontier Foundation is handling the
case and argues that the use of the song was "self-evident non-
infringing fair use" and that Universal "knowingly materially
misrepresent[ed]" that the video infringed their copyrights."
However, this case is the exception to the rule in that takedown
notices are generally met with over-compliance leading to
overprotection of the copyright holders' interests. 45  If web users
were more knowledgeable about the fair use doctrine and the
misrepresentation provision in the DMCA, powerlessness would not
be the norm.
History suggests that creators of transformative works require
multiple tools in their arsenal in order to fend off overly aggressive
copyright holders. 46 Although a predictable application of the fair
use doctrine would reduce the need for copyright misuse as a
139. Harris, supra note 116, at 117.
140. See, e.g., Tom W. Bell, Codifying Copyright's Misuse Defense, 2007 UTAH L. REv. 573,
575.
141. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(0 (2000).
142. See, e.g., Kembrew McLeod, Uri Geller Bends the Web to His Will, L.A. TIMES, Sept.
18, 2007, at A21.
143. Catherine Rampell, Standing Up to Takedown Notices: Web Users Turn Tables on
Copyright Holders, WASH. POST, Oct. 19, 2007, at D1.
144. Complaint, Lenz v. Universal Music Corp. et al., No. 07-3783 (N.D. Cal. 2007),
available at http://www.eff.org/files/filenode/lenz-v-universal/final-lenz-am-cmplt.pdf (last
visited Feb. 23, 2007).
145. Niva Elkin-Koren, Making Technology Visible: Liability of Internet Service Providers
for Peer-to-Peer Traffic, 9 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 15, 33 (2005).
146. See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994).
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defense,'47 it is more than likely that estates will still exaggerate their
limited monopoly rights in the interest of protecting family privacy
and the integrity of original works. The Shloss case illustrates this
point. However, a clearer definition of fair use, coupled with a
viable misuse defense, could empower some artists and scholars to
successfully claim the transformative use rights established in the
Copyright Act.
C. Education and Awareness
The ongoing legal action of the Electronic Frontier Foundation
and the Fair Use Project has been pivotal in raising awareness about
the contours of fair use and the public domain. Yet, more education
is necessary. The news is rife with stories about crackdowns on
illegal downloading of music in violation of copyright.'48 Even the
Boy Scouts of America, in partnership with the Motion Picture
Association of America, created a course to educate Los Angeles
members about the harms of downloading pirated movies and
music.'49 Although these youngsters receive a crash course on why
copyright is important,15 ° there is seemingly no mention of the
concept of fair use, the public domain, or the limited duration of
copyright.''
Copyright notices are everywhere, even on works that are in the
public domain.'52 Furthermore, professional sports leagues, book
publishers, and other media companies systematically overstate their
copyrights to the public in an attempt to scare people away from any
potential fair use of copyrighted works.'53 The information circulated
in the media leaves the individual feeling defenseless upon receipt of
a legal letter pronouncing an alleged copyright infringement. Even if
the individual seeks legal advice, many attorneys advise potential
147. Parchomovsky & Goldman, supra note 104, at 1519-20.
148. See, e.g., Javier C. Hernandez, Schools Broaden Efforts to Stop Piracy, BOSTON GLOBE,
Aug. 16, 2007, at B1.
149. Lawrence Van Gelder, Arts, Briefly: Boy Scouts Learn About Piracy, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
23, 2006, at E2.
150. Id.
151. See Nate Anderson, Boy Scouts Get MPAA-Approved Copyright Merit Badge, ARS
TECHNICA, Oct. 20, 2006, http:// arstechnica.com/news.ars/post/20061020-8044.html.
152. See Jason Mazzone, Copyfraud, 81 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1026, 1040-46 (2006).
153. Jacqueline Palank, Content Makers Are Accused of Exaggerating Copyright, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 2, 2007, at C2.
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clients to simply comply with the letter or avoid using copyrighted
works altogether because of a legitimate fear of future malpractice
suits. 1
54
Some technology companies and civil libertarian groups have
recently come together to create best practices guidelines for online
and broadcast content.155 It is important that these guidelines become
a floor for rights instead of a ceiling; they must create a starting point
for copyright users' rights while keeping gray areas open for
discussion. 56 Furthermore, this information and the additional
statutory rights provided by the DMCA counter-notice provision
must be distributed to the public-at-large through reliable sources.
As at least one scholar notes, copyright users who are aware of the
Chilling Effects website and the services it provides "are less likely
to be intimidated by copyright holders' unfounded threats.'
157
VI. SUCCESS STORIES
As a general rule, artists build on creative works that came
before them, even if the influence is not so obvious as to raise
questions about copyright infringement.'58 Andy Warhol is an
interesting example because he directly copied preexisting images
from the visual world to make his art. When he died in 1987,
Warhol's will required the creation of a foundation to manage his
estate and advance the creative arts. 5 9 Considering that Warhol was
forced to settle claims of copyright infringement during his
lifetime, 6° the Warhol Foundation put careful thought into
establishing its policies regarding copyright.'6
The modus operandi of the Warhol Foundation is very different
from the James Joyce estate. According to Joel Wachs, president of
154. See, e.g., LESSIG, supra note 18, at 190-91.
155. See, e.g., Copyright Adversaries Unite to Produce Fair-Use Best Practices, COMM.
DAILY, Aug. 21, 2007.
156. Id.
157. Meyers, supra note 130, at 234.
158. See id. at 219; Jonathan Lethem, The Ecstasy of Influence, HARPER'S MAG., Jan.-Feb.
2007, at 59.
159. Lawrence Lessig, When Theft Serves Art, WIRED, Jan. 1, 2006, http://www.wired.com/
wired/archive/14.01/posts.html?pg=5.
160. Meyers, supra note 130, at 225-27.
161. Oddly enough, in dicta well after Warhol's death, the California Supreme Court gave
Warhol's appropriation art a ringing endorsement. See Comedy III Prod. v. Saderup, 21 P.3d
797, 811 (Cal. 2001).
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the Warhol Foundation, artists who wish to use Warhol's imagery for
any purpose can do so "without charge and without challenge."' 62
Similarly, scholars can use Warhol imagery "for just a nominal fee to
cover the cost of administering the rights."'63 Artists and scholars
have open access to Warhol's work in the interest of free
expression. 6 When it comes to commercial use, like t-shirts,
calendars, and consumer items, however, the Foundation vigorously
enforces its copyright for financial gain and protection of the original
works.'65 In this estate's model, the economic vision of copyright
coexists with the promotion of creative expression through
transformative use.
When estates allow artists access to copyrighted works for
creative purposes, the results can even surprise the copyright holder.
As Professor Olufunmilayo Arewa notes, "some borrowings in the
popular music context have led to music that surpasses the original
work. Jimi Hendrix's cover recording of the Bob Dylan song 'All
Along the Watchtower,' is so good that even Bob Dylan prefers it
and has played it in the same manner as Hendrix."'66 Due to a fear of
legal repercussions, however, similar transformative artistic visions
have been quashed before the public could even experience them.'67
Although certain estates will elect to do the right thing in
allowing or even enabling creative uses of copyrighted works,
without a legally enforceable system, many famous estates will
continue to abuse their power and censor the work of another
generation of artists and scholars. The threat of copyright litigation
is a powerful weapon and has forced far too many scholars and
artists to alter their work or not publish it at all. By defining and
enforcing the contours of fair use and the public domain, and making
this information available to the public, the creative sphere will
continue to flourish.
162. Lessig, supra note 159.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.; Meyers, supra note 130, at 240.
166. Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, From J.C. Bach to Hip Hop: Musical Borrowing, Copyright
and Cultural Context, 84 N.C. L. REV. 547, 618 (2006).
167. Meyers, supra note 130, at 219.
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VII. CONCLUSION
As Robert Spoo suggests, "[c]opyright in the Joyce Estate's
hands has become more a sword than a shield."' 6t Stephen Joyce
would not have been able to enforce his warped vision of estate
management for so long without the aid of our failing copyright
system. While taking advantage of the system and censoring the
work of countless artists and scholars, however, the Joyce estate has
also brought to light some possible solutions to the problems that
plague the current copyright regime.
With digital technology and the unprecedented use of
copyrighted works by artists, scholars, and the public-at-large, it is
vital that the judicial and legislative branches enforce and enhance
common law and statutory protections for copyright users. Fair use
and misuse should be discussed in the same context as copyright
infringement. Costly litigation should not be used to smother the
creativity of another generation of artists. We must remember that
the grant of copyright protection was developed to promote creativity
in the arts, not hinder it. Even though copyright must adapt to
changed conditions, its purpose remains the same.
168. Spoo, supra note 17, at 13.
